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This  article  employs  a  real  options  approach  to  investigate  the 
determinants of an optimal capital structure in real estate investment. An 
investor has the option to delay the purchase of an income-producing 
property  because  the  investor  incurs  sunk  transaction  costs  and 
receives stochastic rental income. At the date of purchase, the investor 
also chooses a loan-to-value ratio, which balances the tax shield benefit 
against the cost of debt financing resulting from a higher borrowing rate 
and a lower rental income. An increase in the sunk cost or the risk of 
investment will not affect the financing decision, but will delay investment. 
An increase in the income tax rate or a decrease in the depreciation 
allowance  will  encourage  borrowing  and  delay  investment,  while  an 
increase  in  the  penalty  from  borrowing,  a  decrease  in  the  investor’s 
required  rate  of  return,  or  worse  real  estate  performance  through 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This article investigates the investment and financing decisions of a real estate 
investor who considers the acquiring of an income-producing property through 
debt financing. The existing literature that theoretically investigates this issue 
includes  Cannaday  and  Yang  (1995,  1996),  Gau  and  Wang  (1990),  and 
McDonald     (1999).
1
 All  of  these  articles  assume  that  the  investor  must 
purchase the property now or never. Our article significantly differs from them 
because we allow a property investor to have the option to delay the purchase. 
 
This article, which belongs to the burgeoning literature that applies the real 
options approach to investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), assumes that an 
investor chooses an optimal date to maximize the net expected present value of 
an income-generating property. The investor receives the  stochastic income 
generated  from  the  service  of  this  property,  but  incurs  sunk  costs  such  as 
statutory costs and third-party charges (Brueggeman and Fisher, 2006). The 
interaction of these sunk costs and the stochastic cash  flow confers on the 
investor an option value to delay the purchase of property. Consequently, the 
investor will not purchase the property until s/he is sufficiently satisfied with 
the current income generated by the service of the property. At the optimal date 
of purchasing, the investor also chooses a loan-to-value ratio that involves the 
tradeoff as follows: the investor enjoys tax deductible benefits from interest 
payments and capital depreciation, but will be charged a higher mortgage rate 
when  the  loan-to-value  ratio  increases,  and  may  receive  a  lower  income 
because the potential tenants may be willing to pay less as they realize that 
their landlord is highly indebted, and thus, highly susceptible to bankruptcy.
2 
 
Aside from allowing the investor to delay the purchase of property, our article 
also departs from the existing literature in the following respects. First, we 
assume that property value is endogenously determined, while Cannaday and 
Yang (1995; 1996), and McDonald (1999) assume that the purchase price and 
the  net  selling  price  of  a  property  are  both  exogenously  determined.  Our 
assumption is more plausible because the evolution of the stochastic income 
generated by the service of a property determines the dynamic evolution of the 
property value. Second, we assume that debt financing may adversely affect 
real estate performance, such that investment and financing decisions interact 
with each other. As such, factors that characterize the evolution of the property 
                                                      
1  Ever since the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the determinants of 
corporate borrowing have been a heated topic in the corporate finance literature. See, 
for example, the survey paper by Harris and Raviv (1991), and Myers (2003). This 
topic has received little attention, however, in the real estate investment literature. See 
the discussions in Gau and Wang (1990) and Clauretie and Sirmans (2006, Chapter 15). 
2  This tradeoff significantly differs from that addressed in the finance literature, which 
also allows the tax advantages of borrowing, but considers the costs associated with 
either financial distress, or the conflict of interest between equity and debt holders. See, 
for example, Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2003). Optimal Capital Structure in Real Estate Investment      3 
 
value will also affect the optimal level of debt. In contrast, Cannaday and Yang 
(1995; 1996), and McDonald (1999) abstract from this adverse effect, and thus, 
the investment and financing decisions are independent.
3 
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. We first present the basic 
assumption of the model, and then derive the conditions for the investment 
timing  and  the  loan-to-value  ratio  decided  by  an  investor  who  indefinitely 
holds the property. We further consider the polar case where debt financing 
does  not  affect  real  estate  performance,  in  which  we  derive  some  testable 
implications with regards to the determinants of debt financing. We then move 
to a more general case, in which debt financing adversely affects real estate 
performance,  but  find  that  most  of  our  theoretical  predictions  become 
indefinite. Consequently, we employ plausible parameters in order to carry out 
some numerical comparative-statics testing in the following section. The last 
section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.   
 
 
2.  The Model 
 
The model presented in this section extends that of McDonald (1999), which in 
turn, resembles that of Cannaday and Yang (1995, 1996). We depart from these 
studies by allowing non-negligible transaction costs, uncertainty in demand, as 
well as endogenously determined property values. Consider an investor who 
chooses an optimal date to purchase a commercial property, as  well as the 
percentage of debt to finance the purchase. For ease of exposition, we consider 
the interest only mortgage loan. That is, we assume that the investor pays only 
interest  in  the  holding  period,  and  repays  the  principal  when  selling  the 
property. Suppose that we start at time t0. Then, the expected net present value 
of this investment is given by: 
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where  T  is  the  date  on  which  the  property  is  purchased;  ATCF(s)  is  the 
after-tax cash flow from the net operating income at time t; ) ( t T ATER +
 is the 
after-tax equity reversion from selling the property at time ) ( t T + , where t  is 
the  holding  period  of  the  real  estate  investment;  ρ  is  the  equity  investor’s 
required  rate  of  return; EI (T) is  the  initial  equity  investment; and f is  the 
transaction cost. 
 
                                                      
3  Our article also differs from Gau and Wang (1990) and McDonald (1999), as these 
two studies allow for the cost associated with bankruptcy (Stiglitz, 1972) when the 
investor  fails  to  pay  off  debt  obligations.  Our  article,  however,  abstracts  from  this 
bankruptcy cost. 4      Jou and Lee 
 
 
Each of the four terms in Equation (1) is defined as follows. The after-tax cash 
flow for the investor is written as:   
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( / ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( M r T MH τ n T H τδ s P τ s ATCF − − + − = ,        (2)   
where t T s T   + < < .  The  term  τ  is  the  (constant)  income  tax  rate,  δ  is  the 
proportion of the property that is depreciable capital (that is, not land), M is the 
loan-to-value ratio, n is the  length of the depreciation period (39 years for 
commercial real estate in the U.S.)
4  r (M) is the borrowing rate (where r’ (M) > 
0), H (T) is the initial housing price at time T, and P(s) is the net operating 
income generated from the property investment at time s, which follows the 
geometric Brownian motion as given by:   
) ( ) ( σ ) ( ) (   ) ( s dZ s P ds s P M s dP + = ,                              (3) 
where   (M) is the expected growth rate of P (s), expressed as a non-positive 
function of M, σ is the instantaneous volatility of the growth rate, and dZ (s) is 
an increment to a standard Wiener process. The housing price at time s, H (s), is 
equal to the expected discounted present value of the net operating income, 
and is thus given by:   
 







= .                                                (4) 
Note  that  both  the  interest  payments,  MH  (T)  r  (M),  and  straight-line 
depreciation permitted under the tax code, δH (T)/n, are tax deductible. Upon 
investment, the property investor trades the tax shield benefits with two types 
of costs associated with debt financing when choosing a loan-to-value ratio. 
The first one, which is already addressed in Cannaday and Yang (1995, 1996), 
and  McDonald  (1999),  indicates  that  the  borrowing  rate  increases  with  the 
loan-to-value  ratio,  given  that  the  investor  is  more  likely  to  default  when 
borrowing more. This positive relation is supported by the empirical study of 
Maris and Elayan (1990). The second one, which is novel to the literature, 
indicates  that  the  expected  growth  rate  of  the  net  operating  income  is 
non-increasing with the loan-to-value ratio. This non-positive relation indicates 
that those who intend to rent commercial property may be willing to pay less 
when  they  realize  that  their  landlord  bears  more  debt  and  is  thus,  more 
susceptible  to  bankruptcy.  This  is  plausible  because  those  who  rent  in  a 
commercial property, such as a shopping mall, would typically rather stay at 




                                                      
4  Note that depreciation is only allowed for the period of n even if the holding period 
t is longer than n. 
5  This  assumption  is  also  plausible  for  a  competitive  commercial  property  market 
where  landlords  who  substantially  borrow  may  need  to  lower  the  rent  to  attract 
potential tenants.   Optimal Capital Structure in Real Estate Investment      5 
 
The after-tax equity reversion for the investor at time  T t +   is given by:
6 
)] / ) ( δ ( ) ( ) ( [ τ ) ( ) ( ) ( n t T H T H t T H T MH t T H t T ATER + − + − − + = + ,    (5) 
where ) ( t T H +  is the selling price on date  t T +  at which the investor receives 
the payment. On this date, however, the investor must also pay off the loan 
balance, ) (T MH ,  and  pay  taxes  on  the  capital  gain  of  + − + ) ( ) ( T H t T H  
) / ) ( ( n t T H δ In addition, the amount of equity investment at time T is simply: 
  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( T H M T EI − = ,                                          (6) 
Finally, the transaction cost f is also novel to the literature. As Brueggeman 
and Fisher (2006, Chapter 4) suggest, a mortgage loan borrower, who is also 
the buyer of a property in our framework, incurs statutory costs and third- 
party charges. The former includes certain charges for legal requirements that 
pertain to the title transfer, recording of the deed, and other fees required by 
state and local law. The latter includes charges for services, such as legal fees, 
appraisals, surveys, past inspection, and title insurance. All of these changes, 
however, are unrecoverable after the property is purchased.
7   
 
Given that the investor incurs sunk costs in purchasing a property and that the 
property offers a stochastic cash flow in the future, the investor must thus wait 
for a sufficiently  good state of nature to purchase  the property, as the real 
options literature suggests (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Specifically, the investor 
simultaneously chooses a date T and a loan-to-value ratio M, so as to maximize 
the expected net present value of the investment. This problem is defined as:   




0 M T t t P W E Max t t P W t
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= .                  (7) 
As  indicated  by  Dixit  and  Pindyck  (1994,  p.139),  when  the  net  operating 
income  is  stochastic,  we  are  unable  to  find  a  non-stochastic  timing  of 
investment. Instead, the investment rule takes the form where the investor will 
not purchase the property until the net operating income P(t0) reaches a critical 
level, denoted by P
*. At that instant, the investor will choose a loan-to-value 
ratio, denoted by M
*. Consequently, the initial purchase price of the property, 
P
*/ (ρ−  (M
*))  as  given  by  Equation  (4),  is  endogenously  determined.  Our 
model thus significantly departs from that in the literature as we endogenize 
the value of the property. 
 
V2 (P (t), t) is denoted as the gross value of investment, i.e., 
                                                      
6  Note that Equation (5) applies to the case in which t n ≤ . Whenn t > , we need to 
imposen t = .   
7  Broadly speaking, the property buyer also incurs the transaction sunk cost such as 
opportunity cost in the form of time spent on negotiating with both the property seller 
and the mortgage loan provider. 6      Jou and Lee 
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where  T t ≥ ,  and  )) ( ( 1 t P V  is denoted as the investor’s option value from 
waiting  in  the  region  where  *
0 ) ( P t P < .  The  investor’s  option  value  is 
time-independent, i.e.,  0 / ) ( 1 = ∂ ⋅ ∂ t V , because the investor has some leeway 
in choosing the timing of investment rather than being forced to purchase the 
property  during  a  finite  period  of  time.  By  applying  Ito’s  lemma,  V1 (P (t)) 
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By contrast, if 
*
0) ( P t P ≥ and t ≥ t0, then the investment is made, and thus, V2 
(P (t), t) satisfies the partial differential equation given by: 
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The boundary condition is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) t T ATER t T t T P V + = + + , 2 .                            (11) 
Equation (10) has an intuitive interpretation. If we treat V2 (P (t), t) as an asset 
value, then the expected capital gain of the investment (the sum of the first 
three terms on the left-hand side) plus the dividend (the sum of the last three 
terms on the left-hand side) must be equal to the return required by the investor 
(the  term  on  the  right-hand  side). Equation  (11)  simply  says  that  when  the 
investor  sells  the  property,  the  value  of  the  property  must  be  equal  to  the 
after-tax equity reversion for the investor. 
 
Appendix A shows that when an investor holds a property for an infinite time 
horizon,  then  the  investment  and  financing  decisions  for  the  investor 
respectively satisfy the two equations given by: 
0
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Equation (12) is derived based on the condition that an investor balances the 
immediate benefit from purchasing a property against the benefit from waiting 
for a more favorable state of nature. Equation (13) is derived based on the 
condition that an investor trades off the benefit from the tax advantages of debt 
financing against the adverse effect of debt financing that results from a higher 
borrowing rate and a possible lower expected growth rate of the net operation 
income.  We  can  simultaneously  use  Equations  (12)  and  (13)  to  derive  the 
solution for the choice of the loan-to-value ratio, M
*, and that for the critical 
level of the net operating income that triggers investment, P
*.   
 
To compare our model with those in the existing literature, we first investigate 
the polar case where debt financing does not affect real estate performance at 
all, i.e.,  ’ (M) = 0. From Equation (13), this condition implies that:   
  0 )) ( ' ) ( )( τ 1 ( ρ = + − − M Mr M r .                          (16) 
Equation (16), which is exactly the same as that in McDonald (1999), suggests 
that an investor will choose a higher loan-to-value ratio, if the investor either 
requires a higher rate of return, faces a lower income tax rate, or is penalized 
less when borrowing more. 
 
Let us switch to the case where debt financing adversely affects real estate 
performance, i.e.,  ’ (M 
*) < 0. Given this premise and the requirement that 
0 / ) , (
* * * < ∂ ∂ M M P H , it follows that M 
*
 < Ma, where Ma is defined as the M 
that  satisfies  Equation  (16).  In  other  words,  when  debt  financing  adversely 
affects  real  estate  performance,  then  the  loan-to-value  ratio  chosen  by  the 
investor will be lower than its counterpart when debt does not affect real estate 
performance at all. 
 
We  assume  that  an  investor  simultaneously  makes  the  investment  and  the 
financing  decision.  In  order  to  make  comparisons  with  the  results  of  the 
literature, we will first separately investigate each decision, assuming that the 
other decision is exogenously given. Differentiating H (P
*, M
*) = 0 in Equation 
(13)  with  respect  to  its  various  underlying  parameters  yields  the  following 
results. 
 
Proposition 1 Given the timing in the purchase of a property, the investor will 
take on more debt (M 
* increases) if: (i) the investor is allowed to depreciate 
capital less rapidly (n increases); (ii) the investor is penalized less through 
debt financing (r ’(M) decreases); (iii) the investor expects borrowing to exhibit 8      Jou and Lee 
 
 
a less adverse impact on real estate performance (the absolute value of  ’(M) 
is smaller); and (iv) the investor has less depreciable capital (δ decreases).
8 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
The  result  of  Proposition  1(ii)  is  the  same  as  that  in  the  literature  such  as 
McDonald (1999), and the reason for Proposition 1(iii) is obvious. The result 
for  Propositions  1(i)  and  1(iv)  may  seem  to  counter  intuition  at  first  sight 
because  tax  deductions  from  depreciation  allowance  will  be  lower  as  the 
investor is either allowed to depreciate capital less rapidly (n increases) or has 
less  depreciable  capital  (δ  decreases).  However,  it  is  the  interaction  effect 
between  ’ (M) and δ or n that matters for the financing decision. As suggested 
by Equation (13), an increase in n or a decrease in δ will mitigate the negative 
impact  on  real  estate  performance  which  results  from  an  increase  in  the 
loan-to-value ratio, thus encouraging the investor to borrow more. 
 
Differentiating  D (P
*, M
*) = 0  in  Equation  (12)  with  respect  to  its  various 
underlying parameters yields the following results. 
 
Proposition 2 Given an investor’s loan-to-value ratio, the investor will delay 
the purchase of a property (P 
*
 increases) if: (i) the investor incurs a larger 
transaction cost ( f increases ); (ii) the investor is allowed to depreciate capital 
less  rapidly  (n   increases);  (iii)  the  investor  is  penalized  more  through  debt 
financing (r’(M
*)  increases);  (iv)  the  investor  expects  to receive  less  return 
through debt financing (the absolute value of  ’(M 
*) is larger); (v) the investor 
has less depreciable capital (δ decreases); and (vi) the investor faces a higher 
risk in purchasing the property (σ increases); and (vii) the investor faces a 
higher income tax rate (τ increases).
9 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
Propositions 2(i) and (vi) are the standard results of the real options literature 
(see,  for  example,  Dixit  and  Pindyck,  1994),  which  indicate  that  greater 
uncertainty  and/or  irreversibility  will  delay  investment.  The  other  scenarios 
stated in Proposition 2 follow because an investor will receive less return from 
investing immediately. 
 
Propositions  1  and  2  help  us  investigate  how  the  various  forces  affect  the 
investment and financing decisions for the case where these two decisions are 
interacting with each other. We, however, can only reach definite comparative 
-statics results for the two exogenous forces, namely, the sunk costs and the 
risk of investment, as stated below in Proposition 3.     
                                                      
8  Furthermore, we find that an investor’s incentive to borrow is ambiguously affected if 
the investor either faces a higher income tax rate (τ is higher) or requires a higher rate 
of return (ρ is higher). See Equations (B5) and (B6), respectively. 
9
 Furthermore, we find that an investor’s incentive to purchase property is ambiguously 
affected if the investor requires a higher rate of return, as suggested by Equation (C7). Optimal Capital Structure in Real Estate Investment      9 
 
 
Proposition 3 An investor who incurs a larger sunk cost of investment or faces 
a higher risk of investment will not alter the loan-to-value ratio, but will delay 
investment and receive a higher net investment value.   
Proof: See Appendix D.   
 
We use Figure 1 to explain the results of Proposition 3. Suppose that we start 
from an initial point E0, which is the intersection of line I0I0 and line F0F0.    In 
the  figure,  line  I0I0  characterizes  the  optimal  condition  for  the  choice  of 
investment timing as shown by Equation (12). Note that we assume that M
* 
exhibits a negative effect on P
* in this figure (our result will be qualitatively 
the same even if M
* exhibits a non-negative effect on P
*).
10  Furthermore, line 
F0F0, which characterizes the optimal condition for the financing decision as 
shown  by  Equation  (13),  is  vertical  because  P
*  will  not  affect  M
* at  all.   
Proposition 2 indicates that an investor who incurs a higher transaction cost or 
faces a higher risk of investment will delay the purchase of a property. This is 
shown in Figure 1, where the optimal timing decision characterized by line I0I0 
will  shift  upward  to  line  I1I1,  while  the  optimal  debt  financing  decision 
characterized by line F0F0 will remain unchanged. Thus, the investor will wait 
for a better state to invest, but will not alter the loan-to-value ratio. The net 
value  of  investment  will  increase,  given  that  the  investor  purchases  the 
property at a better state of nature. 
 
The results of Proposition 3 imply that neither irreversibility nor uncertainty 
will affect an investor’s choice of the loan-to-value ratio. This comes from our 
assumption that an investor has the option to delay the purchase of a property, 
but not the option to default the loan. As a result, the investor will choose the 
same loan-to-value ratio regardless of the state of nature at which the investor 
purchases the property. If we allow the investor to have the default option (see 
e.g., Kau et al., 1993), then these two exogenous forces will also affect the debt 
financing decision of the investor because different states of nature will entail 
different likelihoods of default.
11 
 
We will use plausible parameters to employ a numerical analysis to make our 
theoretical predictions stated in Propositions 1-3 more vivid. We consider both 
cases, that is, where the holding period is infinite and finite. Appendix E shows 





                                                      
10  See Equation (C8) which indicates that M
* exhibits an ambiguous effect on P
*. 
11  If we allow the option to default, then an investor will both purchase a property at an 
earlier date and borrow more because the investor will receive the (put) option value to 
default, which also increases the benefit from borrowing.   10      Jou and Lee 
 
 
Figure 1  The Effect of an Increase in Either the Sunk Cost or the 
Risk of Investment.   
This graph shows that either change will move the equilibrium point from E0, the 
intersection  of  I0I0  (the  line  that  represents  the  optimal  condition  of  the 
investment decision) and F0F0 (the line that represents the optimal condition of 
the financing decision), to E1. As a result, choices of the loan-to-value ratio will 
remain unchanged at M0
*; while the critical level of the net operating income that 







3.  Numerical Analysis 
 
We assume that M r M r 1 0 λ ) ( + = , and  M M 2 0 λ   ) (   + = , such that  1 λ ) ( ' = M r
  (> 0) 
and ) 0 ( λ ) ( '   2 < − = M . Our chosen benchmark case is as follows: sunk cost f = 
1; income tax rate τ = 20%; required rate of return on equity ρ=12% per year; 
the  number  of  years  allowed  for  depreciation  for  tax  purposes  n = 39  years; 
proportion of depreciable capital δ = 0.5; minimum borrowing rate r0 = 7% per 
year; as an investor increases the loan-to-value ratio by 1%, then the mortgage 
rate that the investor faces will be increased by 0.05%, i.e., λ1= 0.05; the net 
operating income is expected to grow at most 2%, i.e.,  0
 = 2% per year; an 
investor  expects  the  growth  rate  of  the  net  operating  income  to  decline  by 
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the instantaneous volatility of that growth rate is equal to 15% per year, i.e., σ 
= 15% per year; and the holding period is infinite, i.e.,  ∞ = t .
12   
 
 
Table 1  Determinants of the Investment Timing and Loan-to-Value 
Ratio. 
Benchmark case: f = 1, τ = 20%, ρ = 12% per year, n = 39 years, δ = 0.5, 
r0 = 7% per year, λ1 = 0.05,  0 = 2% per year, λ2 = 0.01,σ = 15% per 
year,t =∞, M 
* = 79.52%, P 
*=4.5324, and W 
*=0.4483.   
  Variation in f 
  0.5  0.75  1  1.25  1.5 
M 















  Variation in τ 
  10%  15%  20%  25%  30% 
M 















  Variation in ρ 
  11.5%  11.75%  12%  12.25%  12.5% 
M 















  Variation in n 
  31  35  39  43  47 
M 















  Variation in δ 
  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.55  0.6 
M 















  Variation in λ1 
  0.045  0.0475  0.05  0.0525  0.055 
M 



















                                                      
12  According to Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1990), during the period of 1969 to 1989, 
the annual standard deviation for REITs on commercial property was equal to 15.4%. 
We use this as a proxy for the volatility of the growth rate of the net operating income. 12      Jou and Lee 
 
 
(Table 1 continued) 
  Variation in λ2 
  0  0.005  0.01  0.015  0.02 
M 















  Variation in σ 
  10%  12.5%  15%  17.5%  20% 
M 















  Variation in  t  
  10  15  20  25  30  ∞ 
M 


















*: the optimal loan-to-value ratio; P 
*: the critical level of the net operating 
income that triggers investment; W 
*: the net value of investment; f : the sunk cost of 
investment;  τ:  the  income  tax  rate;  ρ:  an  investor’s  required  rate  of  return;  n:  the 
number  of  years  allowed  for  depreciation  for  tax  purposes;  δ:  the  proportion  of 
depreciable capital; r0: the minimum borrowing rate; λ1: the size of the effect of debt 
financing on the borrowing rate;  0: the maximum  expected  growth rate of the net 
operating income; λ2: the size of the effect of debt financing on that expected growth 




Given this set of benchmark parameter values, we find that the investor will 
not purchase a property until the net operating income reaches 4.5324 (P 
* = 
4.5324).  At  that  instant,  the  investor  will  use  79.52%  debt  to  finance  this 
purchase (M 
* =79.52%), and will receive a net value equal to 0.4483 (W 
* = 
0.4483.
13  We  also  find  that  the  P
*  and  M
*  defined  in  Equation  (12)  are 
negatively correlated, as shown by line I0I0 in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Table 1 shows the results for f changes in the region (0.5, 1.5), τ in the region 
(10%, 30%), ρ in the region (11.5%, 12.5%), n in the region (31, 47), δ in the 
region (0.4, 0.6), λ1 in the region (0.045, 0.055), λ2 in the region (0, 0.02), σ in 
the region (10%, 20%), and  t in the region of (10,∞), holding all the other 
parameters at their benchmark values. 
 
 
                                                      
13  The ratio of the sunk cost, f, to the housing price, P
*/ (ρ-  (M
*)), is equal to 2.38%, 
which is a little lower than the average level (see, e.g., 5-6% estimated by Stokey, 2009, 
p.108). Either a lower tax rate or lower degree of uncertainty will drive this ratio close 
to the average level (See Table 1).   Optimal Capital Structure in Real Estate Investment      13 
 
Figure 2  The  Effect  of  an  Increase  in  Either  the  Tax  Rate  or  the 
Length of Depreciation for Tax Purposes, or A Decrease in 
Depreciable Capital.     
This graph shows that each change will move the equilibrium point from 
E0 to E1, such that choices of the loan-to-value ratio will increase from 
M0
* to M1
*, and the critical level of the net operating income that triggers 
investment will increase from P0
* to P1




Table 1 indicates the following results. First, (a) an investor will wait for a 
better state to purchase a property and receive a higher net value (both P
* and 
W
* increase), but will choose the same level of debt (M
* remains unchanged) if 
the investor incurs a higher transaction cost (f increases) or faces a higher risk 
(σ increases). These results conform to those stated in Proposition 3. Second, 
(b) an investor will wait for a better state to purchase a property and use more 
debt, but receive a lower net value (both P
* and M
* increase, but W
* decreases), 
if  the  investor  faces  a  higher  income  tax  rate  (τ  increases),  is  allowed  to 
depreciate capital less rapidly (n increases), or has less depreciable capital (δ 
decreases). Third, (c) an investor will wait for a better state to purchase the 
property and receive a  higher net  value, but  use less debt (both P
* and  W
* 
increase, and M
* decreases), if the investor either requires a lower rate of return 
(ρ  decreases)  or  is  penalized  more  through  debt  financing  (λ1  increases). 
Fourth, (d) an investor will wait for a better state to purchase the property, but 
will use less debt and receive a lower net investment value (P
* increases, and 
both M
* and W
* decrease), if borrowing exhibits a more adverse impact on real 
estate performance (λ2 increases). Finally, (e) an investor will choose almost 
the same debt-to-loan value ratio for all holding periods. However, this is not 
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shorter than thirty years, the investor will wait for a better state to purchase a 
property and receive a higher net value (both P
* and W
* increase) if the investor 
holds the property longer (t increases). However, for holding periods longer 
than  thirty  years,  both  P
* and  W




Figure 3  The Effect of an Increase in Penalty Through Borrowing, A 
Decrease  in  the  Investor’s  Required  Rate  of  Return,  or  a 
More  Adverse  Effect  of  Debt  Financing  on  Real  Estate 
Performance.   
The graph shows that each change will move the equilibrium point from 
E0 to E1, such that choices of the loan-to-value ratio will decrease from 
M 0
*  to  M 1
*,  and  the  critical  level  of  the  net  operating  income  that 





The reason for Result (b) is as follows. Consider an investor who is allowed to 
depreciate capital less rapidly (n increases) or has less depreciable capital (δ 
decreases). Each leads to a direct effect that forces the investor to purchase the 
property later, given the debt level, as suggested by Propositions 2(ii) and (v), 
respectively. This is shown in Figure 2 where line I0I0 shifts upward to I1I1. 
Each change also leads the investor to use more debt as shown by Propositions 
1(i) and (iv), respectively, such that the investor will be induced to purchase at 
an earlier date. This is shown in Figure 2 where line F0F0 shifts rightward to 
line F1F1. The equilibrium point thus shifts from E0 to E1, which indicates that 
the  investor  delays  the  purchase  and  borrows  more.  An  increase  in  the 
*
1 M *
0 M * M
0 F
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loan-to-value ratio, in turn, decreases the net value through lowering real estate 
performance. Similar arguments as the above also apply to the case where an 
investor faces a higher income tax rate (τ increases). 
 
The reason for Results (c) and (d) is as follows. Suppose that an investor is 
penalized  more  through  debt  financing  (λ1  increases).  Proposition  2(iii) 
indicates  that  an  investor  will  delay  purchasing,  given  debt  levels.  This  is 
shown by a shift from line I0I0 upward to line I1I1 in Figure 3. Proposition 1(iii), 
on  the  other  hand,  indicates  that  the  investor  will  borrow  less,  given  the 
investment timing. This is shown by a shift of line F0F0 leftward to line F1F1 in 
Figure 3. The equilibrium point shifts from E0 to E1, thus suggesting that the 
investor will delay the purchase and also borrow less. Similar arguments as 
above can apply to the case where the investor requires a lower rate of return 
(ρ decreases) or debt exhibits a more adverse effect on real estate performance 
(λ2 increases). The net investment value will increase when either λ1 increases 
or ρ  decreases  because  the  investor  invests  at  a  better  state  of  nature.  By 
contrast,  the  adverse  effect  of  an  increase  in  λ2  will  outweigh  the  positive 
effect that results from investing at a better state of nature such that the net 
investment value will decrease as a result. 
 
Finally,  the  reason  for  Result  (e)  is  as  follows.  Consider  that  an  investor 
increases the holding period in the region capped by thirty years. The value of 
the option to wait thus becomes more valuable as the holding period increases. 
As a result, the net investment value also increases. Nonetheless, the above 
pattern will eventually reverse when the holding period is longer than thirty 
years.  The  reason  is  obvious.  Given  that  an  investor  enjoys  tax  deduction 
benefits from depreciation allowance for at most thirty nine years, the investor 
is unable to continuously receive a higher net value from the investment over 
an infinite horizon. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This article employs a real options approach to investigate the determinants of 
an optimal capital structure in real estate investment. We have assumed that an 
investor  incurs  transaction  costs  when  purchasing  an  income-producing 
property that yields a stochastic net operating income. We find several testable 
implications as  follows. First, an investor  who  incurs a larger sunk cost or 
faces a higher risk of investment will not alter the loan-to-value ratio, but will 
delay investment. Second, an investor who either faces a higher income tax 
rate  or  receives  lower  depreciation  allowance  for  tax  purposes  will  borrow 
more and delay investment. Finally, an investor who either pays more penalties 
from borrowing, requires less return for equity investment, or has worse real 
estate performance through borrowing will borrow less and delay investment. 
 16      Jou and Lee 
 
 
This  article  builds  a  simplified  model,  and  thus,  can  be  extended  in  the 
following  ways.  First,  this  article  implicitly  assumes  that  an  investor  has  a 
monopolized right to purchase a certain income-producing property (see, for 
example, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). A more sophisticated model may allow 
different investors to compete for a certain property, or allow the seller of the 
property to play a more active role. Second, this article abstracts from several 
aspects  of  real  estate  financing,  such  as  variable  mortgage  rates  and 
prepayment penalties. It deserves further investigation of whether these factors 
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Appendix A  The Case for  t = ∞ = ∞ = ∞ = ∞  
If  ∞ = t , then  0 / ) ), ( ( 2 = ∂ ∂ t t t P V ,  and  0 ) (
) ( ρ 0
0 = +
− + − t t T
t e t T ATER E .  For 
this case, suppose that  )) ( ( 1 t P V
 and  )) ( ( 2 t P F denote the option value of waiting 
in  the  region  where *
0) ( P t P < and  the  property  value  in  the  region  where 
( ) * 0 P t P ≥ , respectively. Substituting V1
 (P (t)) = P (t) 
β into Equation (8) yields 
the quadratic equation for solving β: 





= + − − − = M φ .              (A1) 




1 1 ) ( ) ( )) ( ( t P A t P A t P V + = ,                              (A2) 
where β1 and β2 are, respectively, the larger and smaller roots of β in Equation 
(A1), and A1 and A2 are constants to be determined. 
 
Similarly, if P (t0) ≥ P
 * such that investment is made, then we can rewrite 
Equation (10) as:   Optimal Capital Structure in Real Estate Investment      17 
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The solution for F2 (P) in Equation (A3) is given by: 
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              (A4) 
where B1 and B2 are constants to be determined. 
 
The terms A1, A2, B1, B2, and the critical level of the net operating income that 
triggers  investment,  P
*,  are  simultaneously  solved  from  the  boundary 
conditions as follows: 
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and 

























= = .                                    (A9) 
Equation (A5) is the limit condition, which states that the investor’s option 
value  from delaying  the purchase  is  worthless as the  net operating  income 
approaches its minimum permissible value of zero. This condition requires that 
A2=  0.    Equations  (A6)  and  (A7)  are  two  other  limit  conditions,  which 
respectively  state  that  after  an  investor  purchases  a  property,  the  investor’s 
option  value  from  abandoning  the  property  is  worthless,  when  the  net 
operating income is extremely bad and extremely good. These two conditions 
require that B1 =B2 = 0.   Equation (A8) is the value-matching condition, which 
states that at the optimal timing of purchasing (t0=T in our case), the investor is 
indifferent between exercising and not exercising the investment. Equation (A9) 
is the smooth-pasting condition, which guarantees that the investor will not 
derive any arbitrage profits by deviating the optimal exercise strategy.   
 18      Jou and Lee 
 
 
Define ρ / ) ( ) τ 1 ( / τδ ) 1 ( τ
* * ρ *
0 M r M np e M A
n − − − + − =
− . Multiplying Equation 
(A9) by P
 */β1, and then subtracting Equation (A8) from it yields: 
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and A2= 0. Furthermore, the choice of M is found by setting the derivative of 
V1 (P 
*) in Equation (A2), or equivalently, f
M
P
M P F −
−
− −
)) (   ρ (
) 1 ( ) (
*
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2 , with 
respect to M equals to zero. This yields: 
0 ))] ( ) ( (
ρ
) τ 1 (
1 [
)) (   ρ (
) ( '  
) , (
* * * 0
*




= M r M M r
M
A M
M P H .      (A12) 
The second-order conditions require that: 
0 / ) , (
* * * < ∂ ∂ P M P D ,                                                                    (A13) 
0 / ) , (
* * * < ∂ ∂ M M P H ,                                                                  (A14) 
and 
.   0 / ) , ( / ) , (
/ ) , ( / ) , (
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
> ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂
P M P H M M P D
M M P H P M P D                                   (A15) 
 
 
Appendix B  Proof of Proposition 1 
Totally differentiating * * ( , ) 0 H P M = in Equation (13) with respect to n, r’ (M 
*), 
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Appendix C  Proof of Proposition 2 
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where  we  have  used  the  relationship  *
1 2 1 2 ( ( )) ( 1)( 1) M β β ρ−µ = β − β − ρ . 
Differentiating P 
* with respect to f, n , δ , σ , τ , ρ and M 
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P ρ .          (C8) 
Proposition 2(iii) follows because as r’ (M 
*) increases, then r (M 
*) in Equation 
(C1) also increases. Proposition 2(iv) follows because as the absolute value of 
 ’ (M 
*) increases, then   (M 
*) in Equation (C1) will decrease.   




Appendix D  Proof of Proposition 3   
Equation (13) indicates that  * * ( , ) H P M  is independent of f and σ, thus suggesting 
that the optimal level of M 
* is neither related to f nor σ. Equations (C2) and (C5) 
then suggest that  * / 0 P f ∂ ∂ >  and  * / 0 P ∂ ∂σ > . Substituting A1 in Equation 
(A11) and P
* in Equation (C1) into the left-hand side of Equation (A8) yields 
the net value of investment equal to 1 /( 1) f β − . Differencing this value with 
respect to f and σ yields 
0
) 1 β (
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Appendix E  The Case for Finite  t  
We follow Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and Hull and White (1990) to find 
P* and M 
*. Let y (t) = ln P (t) such that  * * ln , y P = 1 ( ( )) ( ( )) U y t V P t = for y (t) < y
* 
and  2 ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) Z y t t V P t t =  for  *
0 ( ) y t y ≥ and 0 t t ≥ . As  a  result, Equation (9) 
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Furthermore, Equation (10) can be rewritten as:   
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Equation (11) can also be rewritten as:   
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Finally, Equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
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.                                                                      (E4) 
The choice of M is derived by setting the derivative of  ( ) ⋅ W   in Equation (1) 
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Let ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) / = ∂ ∂ g y t t Z y t t M . Differentiating Equation (E2) term by 
term with respect to M yields: 
.   0 ) ), ( ( ρ
)) (   ρ (
) ( '  
)] ( ) 1 (
τ
[
)] ( ' ) ( [
)) (   ρ (
) τ 1 (
) ), ( (
) (
) ), ( (
) ( '  
) (




) (   (
) (





























t t y g
M
M
e M Mr t
n




t t y g
t y
t t y Z
M
t y
t t y g
M
t y




       (E6) 






(1 ) ( )
( , ) [1 ] 0




y M M e
g y t
M M
.                            (E7) 
The boundary condition for  ( ( ), ) g y t t   is derived by differentiating Equation 
(E3) with respect to M, which yields: 
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We implement the explicit finite difference method (Hull and White, 1990) to 
solve for M
 * and P
*. We begin by choosing a small time interval, t ∆ , and a 
small change in ( ) y t , y ∆ . A grid is then constructed to consider the values of Z 
(t) when y (t) is equal to   
, ,..., , max 1 0 0 y y y y ∆ +  
and time is equal to   
, ,..., , 0 1 0 0 t t t t t + ∆ +  
The parameters y0 and ymax are the smallest and the largest values of y (t), and 
t0 is the current time. Let us denote  1 0 y i y ∆ +  by yi,  1 0 t j t ∆ +  by tj, and the 
value of the derivative security at the (i, j) point on the grid by Zi,j. The partial 
derivatives  of Z (t) with  respect  to  y (t)  at  node  (i, j)  are  approximately  as 
follows: 
1, 1, ( )
( ) 2
i j i j Z Z Z t
y t y
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The time derivative for Z (t) is approximately: 





.                                                                    (E11) 
Substituting Equations (E9) to (E11) into Equation (E2) yields: 
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Similarly, Equation (E6) can be written as: 
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We also need to impose the optimal condition for the timing of investment.   
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where A1 and A2 are constants to be determined, and β1 and β2 are defined in 
Appendix A. The optimal timing is determined by the following boundary 
conditions: 
( ) 0
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Solving Equations (E18)-(E20) simultaneously yields: 
  A2 =  0.                                                                                            (E21) 
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The law of motion for Z(y(t),t) shown in Equation (E12) and that for g(y(t),t) 
shown  in  Equation  (E16)  are  subject  to  two  optimal  conditions  shown  in 
Equations (E7) and (E23), respectively, and two boundary conditions shown in 
Equations  (E3)  and  (E8),  respectively.  Solving  these  four  conditions 
simultaneously yields the solutions for
0 ,
*
1 * , ,
i g M A , and
0 ,
* i Z , where 
0 ,
* i Z   is 
the gross value of investment. We can further use the relation
* * i y
e P = to find 
the critical level of the net operating income that triggers investment, as well 
as the net value of investment, .
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